

Message Text

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TAGS: PFOR, US, NATO

SUBJECT: DR. KISSINGER'S MEETING WITH NATO PERMREPS

JUNE 30.

1. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION IS MEMCON
OF DR. KISSINGER'S MEETING WITH NATO PERMREPS IN SAN
CLEMENTE 9:40 A.M. JUNE 30.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
GENERAL PANSA, DE STAERCCKE (BELGIUM), KRAPF (FRG),
NOGUEIRA (PORTUGAL), ERALP (TURKEY), BUWALDA (DUTCH),
WAGNER (LUXEMBOURG), CHRISTIANSEN (DENMARK), THOMMASSEN
(ICELAND), SOROKOS (GREECE), CROMER (UK), MENZIES (CANADA),
DE ROSE (FRANCE), CATALANO (ITALY), BUSCH (NORWAY),
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RUMSFELD (US), GENERAL STEINHOF (MILITARY COMMITTEE),
DR. KISSINGER, SONNENFELDT, HYLAND, STOESSEL.

3. DR. KISSINGER SAID HE WAS MOST PLEASED TO MEET WITH

THE GROUP. HE HAD TALKED WITH LUNS IN PARIS, WHO HAD SUGGESTED THAT KISSINGER MEET WITH NAC. KISSINGER WAS PLEASED THIS MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE EVEN EARLIER THAN HE HAD ANTICIPATED. HE HAD FOLLOWED WITH MUCH INTEREST REPORTS FROM THE NAC, INCLUDING THOSE COMMENTING ON US AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR AND ALSO COMMENTS ON MBFR AND HUNGARIAN QUESTION. HE WANTED TO MAKE ONE FUNDAMENTAL POINT IN RELATION TO ALL OF THIS.

4. KISSINGER THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME UNDERLYING FEELING THAT US IS HEADING TOWARD A CONDOMINIUM WITH SOVIET UNION AND THAT WE ARE ATTACHING LESS IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE. ACCORDING TO THIS THINKING, US IS TENDING TO MAKE SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS AS CONDITIONS ARE CHANGING. KISSINGER WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THIS AND CLEAR IT UP. HE WISHED TO STATE CLEARLY THE US POSITION TOWARD NATO, EUROPE, AND THE SOVIET UNION.

5. FROM THE FIRST DAYS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, HE SAID, WE HAVE CONSIDERED OUR RELATIONS WITH EUROPE AS CENTRAL TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY. THIS IS WHY THE PRESIDENT'S FIRST TRIP WAS TO EUROPE AND HIS FIRST STOP HAD BEEN AT NATO. KISSINGER NOTED THAT THE US HAS HAD TO OPERATE IN VERY COMPLEX CIRCUMSTANCES. WE DID NOT INVENT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD BEEN FACED WITH 80 LIQUID FUEL SOVIET MISSILES; NOW THE US CONFRONTS OVER 1,000 MISSILES WHICH CAN BE FIRED IMMEDIATELY. THIS IS A FACT OF LIFE. MOREOVER, THERE ARE NEO-ISOLATIONISTS IN THE US. MANY OF THEM ARE THE SAME PEOPLE WHO FORMERLY SUPPORTED NATO, SO THIS WAS A NEW FACTOR. KISSINGER SAID THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN EUROPE, ALTHOUGH OTHERS OUTSIDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION WISHED TO DO SO. IT IS SILLY TO BELIEVE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WANTS TO REDUCE FORCES AND TO MAKE A SEPARATE DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO THIS END. WE DON'T HAVE TO MAKE SUCH A DEAL, SINCE OUR CONGRESS COULD DO IT EASILY FOR US IF WE PER-
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MITTED IT TO DO SO. THUS, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT OUR DOMESTIC SITUATION IS VERY COMPLEX.

6. ALSO, WE HAVE A SITUATION WHERE FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES ARE MORE AND MORE IDENTIFIED WITH RELATIONS WITH OUR ADVERSARIES AND LESS AND LESS WITH OUR FRIENDS. KISSINGER REFERRED TO HIS QTE YEAR OF EUROPE UNQTE SPEECH AND COMMENTS FROM EUROPEAN SOURCES THAT THIS INDICATED THE US WAS TRYING TO ESTABLISH HEGEMONY IN EUROPE OR ATTEMPTING TO ASSERT ECONOMIC BLACKMAIL. THERE WERE ENDLESS DISCUSSIONS ABOUT A FORUM. KISSINGER SAID THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT, IF THE US PUBLIC BELIEVES THAT ALL OF OUR SUCCESSES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH MOSCOW AND

PEKING, WHEREAS WE HAVE ONLY GUERILLA WARFARE WITH WESTERN EUROPE, THEN WE WILL FACE WHAT ALL OF US MOST FEAR, I.E., A TURNING AWAY FROM EUROPE.

7. WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO THE QTE YEAR OF EUROPE UNQTE, KISSINGER SAID THAT IF THE US WANTS AN ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPE WE DO NOT NEED TO ENTER INTO GLOBAL

NEGOTIATIONS. OUR OWN ECONOMIC AGENCIES WILL BE GLAD TO PRODUCE A CONFRONTATION ON THEIR OWN. NOR DO WE HAVE TO THREATEN WITHDRAWAL OF OUR TROOPS IN ORDER TO GET ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS. KISSINGER NOTED THAT IT IS HARD TO ACCUSE THE US OF HEGEMONIAL ASPIRATIONS IN EUROPE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ASSERTING THAT THE US IS SEEKING A CONDOMINIUM WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

8. KISSINGER DID NOT WANT TO DEBATE EVERY POINT, BUT HE DID WISH TO MAKE CERTAIN THINGS CLEAR. THERE IS NO PUBLIC DEMAND IN THE US FOR A QTE YEAR OF EUROPE UNQTE. WE WILL NOT BECOME POPULAR BECAUSE OF IT AND THERE IS NO PRESSURE IN CONGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION. INDEED, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE QTE YEAR OF EUROPE UNQTE MAKES CLEAR THE REQUIREMENT FOR AND MAINTENANCE OF US FORCES IN EUROPE AND CODIFIES OUR PRESENCE THERE, IT WILL GET US INTO A CONFRONTATION WITH CONGRESS.

9. WHAT WE NEED IS A STATEMENT WHICH WILL GIVE AN EXPRESSION OF OUR CONTINUED RELATIONS WITH EUROPE. IF WE CANNOT DO THAT, THE LOGIC OF EVENTS WILL MEAN THAT OUR
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CONTACTS WITH PEKING AND MOSCOW WILL BE THE DRAMATIC ITEMS AND THE CONTACTS WITH EUROPE WILL BECOME A BACKWATER. WHAT WE WANT IN THIS ADMINISTRATION IS TO PUT OUR RELATIONS WITH EUROPE ON THE SAME SYMBOLIC LEVEL AS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, AND EVEN MORE SO IF WE CAN.

10. TURNING TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, KISSINGER SAID WE HAVE NO ILLUSION ABOUT WHAT WE ARE UP AGAINST. LOOKING AT THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF SOVIET LEADERS, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE SOVIET SELECTION PROCESS DOES NOT PRODUCE PEOPLE WITH AN EXCESSIVE CONCERN FOR SCRUPLES. WE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT OUR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS WITH EUROPE ARE INSEPARABLE. WHILE WE SOMETIMES MAY MAKE MISTAKES, THIS WILL NOT BE ON THE BASIS OF SENTIMENTALITY OR BECAUSE WE ARE BEGUILED BY SOVIET CHARMS.

11. KISSINGER SAID WE CANNOT LET THE SOVIET PRE-EMPT THE PEACE ISSUE. THEY WOULD LIKE TO FLOOD US WITH PROPOSALS AND MAKE US LOOK NEGATIVE. THIS COULD BE DEMORALIZING FOR THE WEST. WE WANT TO NEGOTIATE, BUT WE HAVE INSISTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND NOT ON BROAD, INDEFINITE CONCEPTS.

12. KISSINGER THEN REFERRED TO MBFR OR QTE MFR UNQTE AS IT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN. SPEAKING BLUNTLY, HE SAID THAT THE FUTURE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT BE DETERMINED BY WHETHER THE WORDING QTE BALANCED UNQTE IS IN THE TITLE. IT WILL BE DETERMINED BY OUR ABILITY TO REACH A REALISTIC

NEGOTIATING POSTURE. THE US IS PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF KEEPING ITS FORCES IN EUROPE AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE EUROPEANS TO FIGHT US ABOUT THIS. THE ONLY WAY WE CAN HANDLE CONGRESS AND THE SOVIETS IS TO GO TO SPECIFIC ISSUES AND TO DEFINE WHAT WE MEAN BY SECURITY. THEN WE CAN EXPLAIN OUR STAND CONVINCINGLY TO CONGRESS AND WE CAN HANDLE THE SOVIETS.

13. KISSINGER SAID THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ADMINISTRATION WE WERE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION TO ENTER INTO SALT NEGOTIATIONS. THESE WERE THE SAME FORCES WHO NOW PRESS FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, WE HAD RESISTED THESE PRESSURES FOR EARLY SALT
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NEGOTIATIONS AND HAD STUDIED THE PROBLEM THOROUGHLY AND WORKED UP A SOUND POSITION ON IT. WHEN WE WERE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE MATTER WAS A SECURITY ISSUE, WE WERE ABLE TO RESIST PRESSURES FOR ILL-CONSIDERED SCHEMES. WE WANT TO DO THE SAME THING WITH THE QUESTION OF FORCE REDUCTIONS. WE MUST GET SPECIFIC AND ACHIEVE AN AGREED POSITION FAIRLY RAPIDLY.

14. ONCE AGAIN KISSINGER DENIED THAT WE HAD ANY DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS. WE WANT TO PRE-EMPT AN EARLY, FAVORABLE-SOUNDING PROPOSAL FROM THE SOVIETS AND WE CAN ONLY DO THIS WITH A SOUND POSITION WHICH REPRESENTS A SOLUTION WE CAN LIVE WITH.

15. ON CSCE, KISSINGER SAID WE NEVER ESPECIALLY WANTED IT BUT HAD BEEN PUSHED INTO IT BY OUR ASSOCIATES. ALL WE WANT IS TO PREVENT IT FROM BECOMING TOO COSMIC AN EVENT.

16. SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS EXPRESSED THE APPRECIATION FOR THE GROUP FOR THE INVITATION TO COME TO SAN CLEMENTE. HE NOTED THIS WAS NOT A COUNCIL MEETING, BUT THE NEAREST THEY COULD COME TO ONE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. LUNS SAID THAT TWO MAIN AIMS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WERE RECOGNIZED AND SUPPORTED BY ALL NATO MEMBERS: (1) SEEKING BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, AND (2) BROADENING AND DEEPENING US RELATIONS WITH EUROPE. LUNS SAID THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DID NOT FEEL THE US WAS AFTER HEGEMONY IN EUROPE; QUITE THE CONTRARY, THEY WORRIED MORE ABOUT ISOLATIONIST TRENDS IN THE US AND A LESSENING OF INTEREST IN EUROPE.

17. LUNS CONTINUED THAT THE VERY SUCCESS OF US CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA HAD INDUCED IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THE FEAR THAT THE SECOND AIM NOTED

ABOVE HAD LESS PRIORITY THAN THE FIRST FOR THE US. LUNS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET LEADERS AND A STATEMENT MADE BY A US NAVAL AUTHORITY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE AFTER TEN YEARS OF DETENTE READY TO PUSH
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AGAIN FOR WORLD DOMINATION. LUNS AGREED WITH KISSINGER THAT THE QTE B UNQTE IN MBFR IS NOT SO IMPORTANT AND HE HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH THE US-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE STRESSING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN RELATION TO FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS.

18. LUNS NOTED KISSINGER'S VIEWS ABOUT CSCE AND SAID NO ONE IN NATO WANTED A SPIRIT OF FALSE EUPHORIA. HOWEVER, HE OBSERVED THAT, NONETHELESS, THERE ARE COUNTRIES IN EUROPE WHICH FEEL CSCE IS IMPORTANT AND WE MUST BEAR THIS IN MIND. HE FELT THE DANGERS OF EUPHORIA WERE PRESENT IN EUROPE AND IN THE US AS WELL.

19. LUNS STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF PROVIDING TIMELY INFORMATION TO NAC AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR CONSULTATION. THIS IS A GREAT QTE SAFETY VALVE UNQTE AND WAS ONE REASON THE GROUP WAS SO GRATEFUL FOR THE MEETING WITH KISSINGER.

20. KISSINGER REMARKED, WITH REGARD TO THE CSCE, THAT THE US DOES NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING TO BE EASED OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE BY INADVERTENCE OR BY A PIECE OF PAPER. SOMETIMES, THEREFORE, WE DO NOT PUSH SO HARD FOR A PARTICULAR DOCUMENT BECAUSE WE DON'T WANT TO FORCE MATTERS TO A GREAT CONFRONTATION. WE WOULD LIKE TO GET THE CSCE OVER WITH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WON'T PRESSURE IN THIS REGARD, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO HAVE CONFRONTATIONS WHICH COULD GIVE THE WRONG IMPRESSION THAT SOMETHING REALLY IMPORTANT IS HAPPENING.

21. AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE SPOKE OF METHODS BY WHICH COUNTRIES PARTICIPATE IN THE ALLIANCE. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR SMALL COUNTRIES THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE A KIND OF CLEARING HOUSE FOR IDEAS. SPEAKING FRANKLY, HE HAD THE FEELING THAT, ESPECIALLY FOR SMALL COUNTRIES, THIS IS NOT ALWAYS THE CASE. BILATERAL RELATIONS, OF COURSE ARE EFFICIENT, BUT MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ARE NEEDED TO CREATE A BACKGROUND OF UNDERSTANDING. DE STAERCKE FELT WE NEEDED TO DO BETTER CONCERNING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONSULTATIONS (KISSINGER INTERJECTED THAT HE AGREED).

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22. DE STAERCKE CONTINUED THAT EUROPE DOES NOT FEAR US HEGEMONY, BUT HE NOTED THAT EUROPE'S DESTINY IS IDENTIFIED WITH THAT OF THE US AND THAT ANYTHING THE US DOES AFFECTS EUROPE AS WELL.

23. DE STAERCKE AGREED THAT THE US-SOVIET ACCORD TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR COULD CHANGE THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF RELATIONS IN THE WORLD. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT EUROPE WAS CONDUCTING A QTE GUERRILLA WARFARE UNQTE ABOUT US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. HE WELCOMED PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE IN COPENHAGEN WHICH PROVIDED A WAY TO GIVE SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION TO US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. DE STAERCKE WONDERED WHEN SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE NEEDED AND WHAT KIND WAS ENVISAGED.

24. KISSINGER SAID HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO GIVE A FEELING OF SATISFACTORY PARTICIPATION. ALL OF THE AGREEMENTS THE US HAD SIGNED WITH BREZHNEV HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH NATO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE AGREEMENT ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR. THIS HAD BEEN A VERY DELICATE NEGOTIATION IN WHICH THE US HAD TURNED AROUND A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT. THE AGREEMENT WAS BENEFICIAL TO THE ALLIANCE AND IT WAS NOT IN THE ALLIANCE INTEREST TO CRITICIZE IT. THE SOVIETS WANTED TO SEPARATE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WE SHOULD AVOID TAKING THE SAME LINE.

25. KISSINGER SAID NAC SHOULD ORGANIZE ITSELF SO THAT A SEEMINGLY LEGALISTIC APPROACH TO THE LARGE ISSUES BEFORE US CAN BE AVOIDED. WITH REGARD TO THE QTE YEAR OF EUROPE, UNQTE THE US DOES NOT NEED IT FOR ANY NARROW AMERICAN PURPOSE. WE NEED IT SO THAT THE PUBLIC AND THE AMERICAN CONGRESS WILL NOT ALWAYS IDENTIFY US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH TRADE PROBLEMS AND BALANCE OF PAYMENT DIFFICULTIES. WE HOPE THAT WHEN THE PRESIDENT GOES TO EUROPE THERE COULD BE CLEARLY VISIBLE PROGRESS ON WORKING OUT AN EXPRESSION OF VIEWS. EVEN THOUGH EVERYTHING CANNOT BE COMPLETED, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE SOMETHING IN HAND TO SHOW MANSFIELD AND OTHERS WHEN THEY START UP IN THE FALL. THIS WOULD BE USEFUL AS WELL WITH THE SOVIETS.

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26. AMBASSADOR KRAPF SAID THAT SOMETIMES WHEN NAC IS PRESENTED WITH NEW FACTS THAT IT DOES NOT KNOW THE BACKGROUND. HIS GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THE US SUCCESS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THERE HAD BEEN CRITICAL DISCUSSION IN THE GERMAN PRESS. HE WONDERED HOW THIS COULD BE DISPELLED. KRAPF ASKED IF THE SOVIETS KNOW ABOUT THE

AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE MENTIONED IN ARTICLE VI OF THE AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.

27. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED IN THE NAC USE THEIR INFLUENCE STRONGLY TO DISCOURAGE ANY PUBLIC DEBATE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT HAS BEEN WEAKENED. THE US HAD

MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT IN THE EVENT OF WAR WE WILL MAKE NO DISTINCTION AS TO WEAPONS TO BE USED. THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR MEANS PREVENTION OF ALL WAR. THIS IS STATED IN ARTICLE I OF THE AGREEMENT AND REINFORCED IN ARTICLE II. THE AGREEMENT CALLS FOR RENUNCIATION OF FORCE IN GENERAL. WE HAVE NOT TOLD THE SOVIETS IN DETAIL ALL OF OUR AGREEMENTS WITH OUR ALLIES, BUT WE MADE CLEAR TO BREZHNEV THAT ALL ALLIED AGREEMENTS, GUIDELINES AND APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS REMAIN UNAFFECTED.

28. KISSINGER SAID HE HAD SPENT ONE EVENING WITH GROMYKO AND THE PRESIDENT HAD TALKED WITH BREZHNEV FOR AN HOUR TO EXPLAIN OUR APPROACH. THEY HAD NOT CONTESTED OUR INTERPRETATION AND IF THEY DO SO WE WILL COUNTER IT. THE AGREEMENT IS INTENDED TO PUT RESTRAINT ON PEACETIME CONDUCT, NOT ON WARTIME STRATEGY. IT IS CLEAR THAT IF THE SOVIETS THREATEN TO USE FORCE (AS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS IN THE PAST), THIS WOULD VITIATE THE AGREEMENT. KISSINGER REPEATED THAT THE AGREEMENT MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT IS INTENDED AS A RESTRAINT ON SOVIET CONDUCT IN PEACETIME AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD IT BE SEEN AS A MEANS OF MANAGING CRISIS OR FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR.

29. AMBASSADOR DE ROSE THANKED KISSINGER FOR HIS CLARIFICATION. HE NOTED THIS MATTER WAS THE MOST SENSITIVE OF ALL THOSE DISCUSSED BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND NIXON. THE
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SOVIETS SHOULD HAVE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT OUR VIEWS. HOWEVER, QUESTIONS STILL REMAIN IN THE PUBLIC MIND, AND DE ROSE WONDERED IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT, IF ARTICLE V COMES INTO OPERATION, THE AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD NOT STOP THE ALLIANCE FROM USING ALL MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL.

30. KISSINGER SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A STATEMENT OF THIS KIND IN A COMMUNIQUE ON THE QTE YEAR OF EUROPE UNQTE AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THIS BEFORE DECEMBER. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON SUCH A STATEMENT WITH A MINIMUM OF PUBLIC HAGGLING. IN GENERAL, WE DESIRE THE CLEAREST POSSIBLE STATEMENT OF THE ALLIED DEFENSE POSITION. WE DO NOT NEED TO REFER TO US-SOVIET AGREEMENTS, BUT WE COULD STATE THAT IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST EUROPE THE FULL PANOPLY OF ALLIED

FORCE WOULD BE USED IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS.

31. KISSINGER SAID HE WISHED TO STATE HIS VIEWS CLEARLY NOT ONLY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT ALSO ON THE NEED FOR THE NATO ALLIES TO FOCUS ON DEVELOPING A RATIONAL STRATEGY. HE HAD TRIED

WITHOUT GREAT SUCCESS TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE SUPPLY SITUATION. EVERY COUNTRY SEEMS TO HAVE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF MILITARY SUPPLIES WHICH ARE CALCULATED ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EXPENDITURES. THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IT DOES NOT NEED TO BE MENTIONED IN ANY STATEMENT BY THE ALLIANCE. HOWEVER, KISSINGER FELT STRONGLY WE SHOULD NOT BUILD A MILITARY MACHINE WHICH CANNOT FIGHT AND WHICH REPRESENTS MILITARY-BUREAUCRATIC COMPROMISES AT THE LOWEST LEVELS.

32. CATELANO ASKED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE TIMING OF CONSULTATION TO THE USE OF FORCE. KISSINGER SAID THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH REQUIRED THAT CONSULTATION TAKE PLACE BEFORE A RESPONSE IS MADE. IF THE SOVIETS USE FORCE, THEN ARTICLE VI IS APPLICABLE.

HOWEVER, IF SOMETHING LIKE THE BERLIN CRISIS WERE REPEATED, THEN WE WOULD INVOKE ARTICLE IV AS A RESTRAINT. HOWEVER,
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NOTHING IN THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR CONSULTATION AFTER A WAR STARTS. THE AGREEMENT AIMS AT RESTRAINING PRESSURES BY NUCLEAR POWERS ON THIRD COUNTRIES AND IS INTENDED TO RESTRAIN THE START OF A WAR.

33. ERALP ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF AN ALLY OF ONE OF THE NUCLEAR POWERS ATTACKED AN ALLY OF THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWER. KISSINGER SAID THAT IF AN ALLY OF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKS AN ALLY OF THE US, THEN THE NATO TREATY WOULD BE IN FULL FORCE. IF THE SOVIETS THREATEN ONE OF OUR ALLIES SO AS TO ENDANGER PEACE, WE WOULD INSIST ON CONSULTATIONS. IF AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT, THEN ARTICLE VI WOULD APPLY.

34. ERALP ASKED WHAT THE US MEANT BY THE QTE YEAR OF EUROPE. UNQTE DID THIS MEAN THE COMMUNITY OF NINE OR DID IT MEAN ALL NATO MEMBERS? KISSINGER REPLIED THAT THE US HAD IN MIND ALL OF THE COUNTRIES ASSEMBLED AT THE PRESENT MEETING, PLUS IRELAND IF IT WANTED TO BE INCLUDED. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE NINE DID NOT HAVE A SPECIAL ROLE SO FAR AS ECONOMIC MATTERS IN EUROPE WERE CONCERNED; HOWEVER, WE WERE ADDRESSING ALL OF THE COUNTRIES AT THIS MEETING.

35. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MENZIES ABOUT MBFR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, KISSINGER SAID THAT WE GAVE

THE SOVIETS NO ENCOURAGEMENT CONCERNING BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSTANCE. BREZHNEV HAD MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SMALL CUTS IN FORCES BUT HE HAD GIVEN NO SPECIFICS.

36. KISSINGER CONTINUED THAT WE MUST FIND A BETTER,

QUICKER METHOD TO WORK ON MBFR PROBLEMS THAN THE ONE USED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. IT MUST BE MULTILATERAL, BUT IF IT IS VERY CUMBERSOME AND SLOW, THEN THE SOVIETS WILL TRY BILATERAL APPROACHES. KISSINGER SAID THE US AIM IS TO PRESERVE THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE POSSIBILITY OF DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN THE US AND EUROPE.

37. CONCERNING SALT, KISSINGER SAID THE PRINCIPLES STATED
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IN THE SUMMIT REFLECTED OUR TOTAL REJECTION OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO INCLUDE FBS AND NON-TRANSFER. WE ALSO INSISTED ON LANGUAGE CONCERNING EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS WHICH WE EXPLAINED MEANT THAT OUR INTERESTS AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS WERE EQUAL.

38. ON MBFR, KISSINGER OBSERVED THAT, IF THE CONGRESS LEGISLATES CUTS IN US FORCES, OR IF NATO COUNTRIES CUT THEIR FORCES, THEN THIS WILL REMOVE THE SOVIET INCENTIVE TO MAKE THEIR OWN REDUCTIONS. THEY COULD SIMPLY OUTWAIT US.

39. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MENZIES CONCERNING ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS TO CUT FORCES, KISSINGER SAID WE ARE TALKING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF A REDUCTION OF 30,000 MEN. THIS IS NOT A HUGE ECONOMIC FACTOR.

40. AMBASSADOR SOROKOS ASKED HOW WE COULD DISCOURAGE THE GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SUMMIT MEETINGS ON THE PUBLIC. KISSINGER SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION AND WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE EFFECT OF A PROLONGED PERIOD OF DETENTE ON THE SOVIETS, WHATEVER THEIR POSITION MAY BE AT THE OUTSET. HANDLING DETENTE IS A CHALLENGE TO OUR LEADERSHIP. WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR STRENGTH. IT IS NECESSARY AS WELL TO PROCEED TOWARD DETENTE AND WE MUST THINK OF WHAT THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN IF THE SOVIETS WERE ALONE IN PRESSING A DETENTE WHILE THE REST OF US ADHERED RIGIDLY TO OLD POSITIONS. THUS, WE MUST MAKE AN EFFORT TOWARD UNDERSTANDING, BUT WE MUST KEEP IT WITHIN BOUNDS. THE US WILL NOT KNOWINGLY OVERSTEP THESE BOUNDS.

41. THE PRESIDENT SUBSEQUENTLY MET WITH THE PERMREPS FOR ABOUT TWENTY-FIVE MINUTES AND SPOKE TO THEM ABOUT THE BASIC US INTERESTS IN EUROPE AND THE CENTRAL POSITION WHICH

EUROPE OCCUPIES IN US PRIORITIES. THE PRESIDENT ASSURED THE PERMREPS OF THE CONTINUED US COMMITMENT TO DEFEND EUROPE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE AN ATLANTIC DECLARATION, THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO EUROPE IN THE FALL, AND THAT HE WOULD VISIT THE NAC. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT NO ONE SHOULD BE DELUDED BY THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE US-

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SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING. WE HAVE MADE HARD AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS. EVEN THOUGH PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE TOWARD BETTER UNDERSTANDING, IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO LESSEN OUR DEFENSE EFFORTS.

42. FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, THERE WAS A FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH DR. KISSINGER WHICH FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON GENERAL STEINHOFF'S REMARKS CONCERNING LOGISTIC AND SUPPLY PROBLEMS OF THE ALLIANCE. GENERAL STEINHOFF AGREED THAT WE MUST MOVE FROM ABSTRACT TO CONCRETE, BUT HAD TOLD MR. SCHLESINGER THAT NATO HAD LIMITED RESOURCES. WE HAD TO DISCUSS THE CONCEPT OF A SHORT VERSUS LONG WAR, ETC. WE AGREE THAT IN THIS FIELD OF IMPROVEMENTS WE CAN DO MORE BUT IT TAKES A LONG TIME. AS FOR THE AGREEMENT, WHILE IT REMOVES THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR, DOES IT GIVE THE SOVIETS THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH DEPLOYMENTS?

43. DR. KISSINGER SAID THAT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE I, THIS IS AN OBJECTIVE, NOT AN OBLIGATION. IT WOULD BE OUT OF THE QUESTION TO USE THIS ARTICLE TO STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET CASE AGAINST OUR FBS, BECAUSE WE WOULD SAY THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS TO REMOVE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR AND NOT TO HAVE A CONFRONTATION. THEY WILL NEVERTHELESS MAINTAIN THEIR CASE ABOUT EQUAL SECURITY MEANING REMOVAL OF FBS, BUT OUR IMPRESSION FROM DEALING WITH THEM IS THAT THEY WILL SETTLE WHEN THEY ARE UNDER A DEADLINE AND THE PRES- TIGE OF THEIR LEADERS IS INVOLVED. WE WILL HOLD FIRM ON FBS AND NOT SETTLE ON ANYTHING BUT NON-CIRCUMVENTION WHICH NATO HAS APPROVED.

44. DR. KISSINGER THEN TURNED TO DEFENSE PROBLEMS. HE SAID WE WANT A REALISTIC DISCUSSION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL FACTORS. HISTORY SHOWS WE CANNOT EVADE DECISIONS INDEFINITELY. THE ALLIANCE MUST AGREE ON WHAT THE FACTS ARE. WE HAVE WAR GAMES THAT SHOW THE SOVIETS CAN BE ON THE WESER RIVER IN X DAYS OR Y DAYS BUT THESE ARE BASED ON FORCE RATIOS OF ONE TO ONE IN THE SOUTHERN FRONT AND 1.5 TO 1 IN THE NORTH. IN TWO WARS, GERMANY ENJOYED GREAT SUCCESS WITH INFERIOR MANPOWER. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE SOVIETS CONCENTRATED THEIR FORCES AND GAINED 5 TO 1 SUPERIORITY IN THE NORTH. HISTORY SHOWS THAT WE CANNOT AFFORD TO BE PEDANTIC.

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45. WHAT ARE THE ACTUAL CAPABILITIES, WHAT COULD WE ACTUALLY DO? WE SOMETIMES SAY THAT CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IS WITHIN REACH, AND THE EUROPEANS SAY WE MUST USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IMMEDIATELY. AND WE ASK HOW TO USE THEM, BUT WE HAVE ONLY AGREED ON USING THREE. DOES ANYONE BELIEVE THAT THREE WILL STOP THE SOVIETS? WE HAVE THOUSANDS OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR

WEAPONS, BUT NO RATIONAL PLAN FOR USING THEM; PERHAPS THE ONLY THING SAVING US IS SOVIET UNCERTAINTY. WE NEED A REALISTIC DISCUSSION; IF THE DECISION IS FOR MUCH EARLIER USE, THEN WE NEED TO DECIDE HOW TO DO IT. SOONER OR LATER WE WILL PAY A PRICE. WE NEED COMMON LOGISTICAL FACTORS, BECAUSE IF IN TEN YEARS SOME YOUNG SOVIET LEADERS DECIDE TO TEST US WE RISK COLLAPSING.

46. AMBASSADOR DE ROSE RAISED A POINT ON SALT: THE US POSITION IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON AN AGGREGATE ON EQUAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT TECHNOLOGICALLY THE SOVIETS ARE BEHIND. HOW WILL THEY AGREE TO EQUAL NUMBERS IF UNEQUAL IN QUALITY? OR WOULD THEY COME TO EQUALITY IN QUALITY FIRST.

47. DR. KISSINGER REPLIED THAT THERE ARE TWO CONCEPTS: UNEQUAL AGGREGATES AND UNEQUAL QUALITY OR EQUAL NUMBERS AND EQUALITY IN QUALITY. IF THE SOVIETS CAN BE KEPT RELIABLY BEHIND IN MIRV'S, THEN SOME INEQUALITY IN NUMBERS IS NOT SO SIGNIFICANT, BUT IF THEY COULD HAVE EQUAL MIRV'S, THEN WE CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE UNEQUAL NUMBERS. ONCE THEY CATCH UP IN MIRV TESTING WE CANNOT VERIFY A LIMIT. SO IF THEY CAN BE KEPT FROM MIRV TESTING BY A BAN, THERE IS STILL THE QUESTION OF TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY FROM SLBM MIRV TO LAND-BASED ICBM'S. OUR EXPERTS SAY THIS IS VERY DIFFICULT TO DO, AND THAT WE WOULD MAINTAIN AN EDGE, AND IF THEY ARE CAUGHT CHEATING WE COULD THEN TAKE COUNTERMEASURES. DR. KISSINGER SAID THAT HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT US PROPOSALS WILL HAVE TO BE ADAPTED TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE CATCHING UP. OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT THEY WILL BE TESTING MIRV'S.

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48. AMB. CROMER POINTED OUT THAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS ARE MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY PRESS TREATMENT, SUCH AS THE STORIES ABOUT THE BREAK IN THE LINK BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR PUBLIC OPINION TO UNDERSTAND.

49. DR. KISSINGER AGREED AND SAID THAT ALL AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON KNOW WE FACE A COMPLEX SITUATION. EVERY

EXPRESSION OF CONCERN IN BRUSSELS, NO MATTER HOW WELL
INTENTIONED, IS MAGNIFIED AS A FAILURE OF OUR POLICY,
AS A LACK OF INTEREST BY THE EUROPEANS. AT THE WORKING
LEVEL IT MUST BE KEPT IN MIND THAT WHAT IS SAID OUT OF
FRIENDSHIP IN BRUSSELS IS TURNED INTO AN ATTACK HERE

AND THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENT IS TO SHOW THAT RELATIONS
WITH OUR FRIENDS ARE STILL IMPORTANT. THIS IS THE
MAIN THOUGHT BEHIND THE YEAR OF EUROPE. IN DEFENSE
WE MUST GIVE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND LEADERS A BELIEF
THAT ATLANTIC TIES ARE ESSENTIAL, AND THIS IS WORTH
MORE THAN ASSURANCES IN MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE. BUT IF
IT LOOKS LIKE WE ARE EXTORTING IT FROM EUROPE THEN IT
IS NOT WORTH IT.

RUSH

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